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 The Death of Hassan Nasrallah. Did Israel Win?

In a stunning development, Israeli media outlets reported this morning the alleged death of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, in a targeted operation carried out by Israeli special forces. The incident marks a significant escalation amid growing tensions on Israel’s northern border with Lebanon.

This high-profile assassination occurs at a time of intense military escalation and shifting dynamics that could alter the balance of power in the region. With the northern front under increasing pressure, the strategic stakes for both Israel and Hezbollah have reached a critical point.

The event is being viewed as a major turning point, sparking serious concerns about its political and security implications for Lebanon and the broader Middle East. It also raises fears of strong retaliation from Hezbollah and its regional allies, potentially plunging the area into deeper conflict.

Earlier, the Israeli government announced the deployment of two reserve units to the northern front, coinciding with a high-level cabinet meeting. Under these tense circumstances, questions arise about whether Israel has truly learned from the Winograd Commission’s investigations.

The government now faces a comprehensive 600-page report detailing the numerous shortcomings it currently endures. This document serves as a critical reference point for assessing Israel’s strategic decisions moving forward.

As tensions escalate, every move—especially concerning a possible ground offensive in Lebanon—must be carefully measured against the lessons highlighted in the report. The stakes remain high in this fragile regional context.

Discussing the ground attack returns us to 2006, or the 2006 disorder, as it ought to be called. Israel understood that it had serious areas of strength for power, and assuming it had been happy with it, it would have been the victor definitely, yet its loss was due to the ground invasion around then.

To break this difficulty, it should have different information, particularly since it is pursuing one more conflict in the Gaza Strip. This shows that the past conditions are not the slightest bit like the ongoing conditions, and Hezbollah's capacities have changed beginning around 2006 until now, as have Israel's abilities, incidentally.

The real challenge for Israel lies in its limited knowledge of Hezbollah’s capabilities, as it has not engaged in direct conflict with the group for decades. This lack of recent combat experience leaves many uncertainties about Hezbollah’s current strength.

As a result, Israel’s ongoing actions can be seen as attempts to test and assess Hezbollah’s military capacity. This evaluation helps determine how far Hezbollah might escalate tensions and the extent of its resilience in a potential high-level conflict.

Between the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon, it is important to recognize that developments on the northern front cannot be measured solely by Israel’s actions in Gaza. The capabilities and intelligence involved in each region are distinctly different, as previously noted.

When Israel entered the Gaza Strip, it faced chaos and vulnerability. However, it has since developed detailed plans and prepared for all possible scenarios — from best to worst — should it decide to escalate the conflict.

Israel understands that every move it makes against Hezbollah triggers an equivalent response, following a mirror strategy. For each Israeli action, Hezbollah retaliates at the same level and in a similar manner, a dynamic Israel is determined to change.

Israel is aware that Hezbollah has knowledge of multiple sensitive areas and can strike them effectively. This became even clearer after the Hudhud drone footage revealed Hezbollah’s exposed network of critical locations, confirming Israel’s concerns.

Even if such targets fall within Hezbollah’s firing range, Israel faces challenges in managing operations against these sites. Notably, there is a clear distinction between Israel’s handling of the political and military levels, especially regarding media use.

Israel’s experience in the Gaza conflict highlights this divide: while the political level sometimes exaggerated and distorted the narrative, the tactical military level remained precise and measured in its actions.

Israel’s approach to managing the West Bank and Gaza Strip differs significantly from its strategy on the northern front. The challenges and dynamics in each region require distinct responses.

Within Israel’s military and political institutions, voices are acknowledging that resistance is a natural reaction to occupation. These perspectives emphasize that as long as occupation persists, opposition will continue.

Indeed, even within the right-wing, some label opposition fighters as political dissidents without openly stating it. This nuanced view reflects the complex political landscape inside Israel.

Regarding the northern front, Israel’s approach to national security is entirely different. Hezbollah’s ties to Iran and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s long-standing stance on the Iranian threat have heightened tensions. Netanyahu sees this moment as an opportunity to demonstrate the dangers of the Iranian presence, viewing any activity beyond the borders as a serious threat to Israel’s security.

In this way, all political and key contrasts are affected by these dangers as per the Israeli vision, and if anybody in Israel were asked who he feels more sure with, he would pick Netanyahu, regardless of whether he is from the left or quite possibly of Netanyahu's generally passionate rival!

It is essential to understand that there has been a planned vengeance between Israel and Hezbollah starting around 2006. Assuming we return to October 7 and inquire as to why Israel did battle, the response would be that it was cut in the main flank, which is the distinction of military discouragement.

Accordingly, it requirements to reestablish its notoriety, particularly since it has an old quarrel with Hezbollah, so the political vision is by the tactical objectives, and this is as opposed to managing the Hamas record, where there is conflict in Israel in regards to the part or objective of ousting Hamas and managing the Strip.

The main question remains: What is Israel’s chance of success in the Lebanon conflict? Opinions vary widely, reflecting different visions of victory. Some see the goal as pushing Hezbollah beyond the Litani River, while others consider success to mean dismantling Hezbollah entirely.

Another perspective defines victory as achieving a lasting peace settlement in southern Lebanon. This debate ties back to the core objectives of Israeli leaders like Ben Gvir and Smotrich, highlighting the absence of a clear and agreed-upon definition of success.

There is a clear difference in the opposition landscape, even within the Israeli resistance. The resistance acknowledges that entering political negotiations requires first demonstrating strength, as seen in Israel’s 1982 involvement in Egypt and the subsequent Camp David Accords.

However, the current situation differs because Israel is now dealing with groups it labels as terrorist organizations, rather than a sovereign state like Egypt. This limits Israel’s ability to negotiate and reach agreements in the same way.

The central question remains: What does Netanyahu truly want? Is his goal to resettle populations in the northern regions of Israel? Moreover, is he prepared to negotiate the release of prisoners from the Gaza Strip, despite his firm control over the area?

What exactly is Netanyahu seeking, especially regarding the Lebanese front? Does he intend to pass this complex issue onto the Israeli public and future leaders, or is he genuinely considering making compromises at the negotiation table?